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RECENT DECISIONS
ing and renumbering Fourth Avenue between Thirty-second and
Thirty-fourth Streets declared invalid and the proceedings thereunder
enjoined. After a decision for the defendant in the trial court and
pending this appeal, the borough president assigned to the property
of the defendant the number "One Park Avenue" and renumbered
the houses on the east side of Park Avenue between Thirty-fourth
and Thirty-fifth streets, assigning to the plaintiff's property the num-
ber five. On appeal the judgment was reversed. Martha W. Bacon,
et al., v. Hon. Julius Miller, as President of the Borough of Man-
hattan, and One Park Avenue Corporation, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 11,
1927, at 693 (App. Div. 1st Dep't.).
It cannot be denied that the board of aldermen and the borough
president acted under adequate statutory authority in the renaming
and renumbering of the street.' But the authority to act for the
public in such matters, conferred by the people upon public officials,
who are the servants of the people, carries with it the duty of acting
in good faith.2 While a municipality under the police power has
broad and comprehensive rights with reference to many matters,
those rights are based on the theory that the act is a benefit to the
public or is a public necessity. In the instant case no attempt was
made to show either necessity or benefit to the community. The
courts have been careful not to allow the authority of municipal cor-
porations to be used to oppress the inhabitants within their jurisdic-
tions, and for injurious abuses of power and invasions of the legal
rights of persons subject to municipal control there is a remedy in
equity.3 This intervention of equity is demanded in the case of an
arbitrary attempt to take away one man's property and give it to
another where the community does not benefit from and does not
need such action, and courts of equity will give relief in such a
situation.4
NUISANCE-WHAT CONSTITUTEs-RIGHTS OF INFANT TREsPASSER.
-Defendant had been dumping its waste hemp and refuse on the
property of a third party without permission. Its practise had been
to set this waste afire but the refuse was of such nature that the
fire smouldered underneath without the surface indicating it. The
dump was about three hundred feet from the nearest street and not
upon or so near a street that a pedestrian would be injured by
coming in contact with it. A path which skirted the hole about five
feet from its edge had been used by the public for many years.
Plaintiff, an infant of four years, while walking over the dump, and
not using the path, was burned by the hidden fire. He instituted an
action against defendant on the theory that the dump was a nuisance.
Held, plaintiff was a trespasser on the property and the dump being
'Greater New York Charter, § 50 (chapter 466 of the Laws of
1901), as amended by chapter 592 of the Laws of 1916; Greater New
York Charter, § 40; Code of Ordinances of the City of New York, Ch.
23, art. X, § 111.
'Anderson v. The Lord Mayor and Corporation of Dublin, L. R.,
Ireland, vol. 15, 1885-1886, p. 410.
'Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., vol. 4, § 1573, p. 2751.
' N. Y. L. J., Nov. 16, 1927, at p. 776.
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on private land and a considerable distance from any public highway
or street was therefore not a nuisance. Carlow v. Manning Paper
Co., 221 App. Div. 415, 223 N. Y. Supp. 358 (3rd Dep't. 1927).
The decision is consistent with the law of this jurisdiction.
Negligence was not involved hence the plaintiff was required to
stand or fall by his proof of nuisance. The court does not touch
on the fact that defendant was also a trespasser who had no more legal
right to be on the premises than plaintiff. In principle there should
be no difference in the law because of it. Either a given thing
is a nuisance or it is not a nuisance, whether brought into being by
the owner of property on which it is located or by a trespasser. The
advantage of alleging nuisance is that all persons creating and con-
tinuing it are liable irrespective of their negligence, in the absence
of contributory negligence on the part of the injured person.'
From the earliest times it has been recognized as a nuisance for
one to obstruct or interfere with the right of the public to free and
safe use of a highway for purposes of travel, 2 but in the instant
case there was affirmative evidence that the alleged nuisance was a
considerable distance from the nearest public highway, hence the
question of illegal obstruction did not enter. It is doubtful whether
a different rule would have obtained had the action been in negligence.
The rule is that the owner or occupier of land owes no duty to keep
his premises safe in behalf of trespassers 3 or others who come thereon
without right or invitation. 4 As to them the obligation is to refrain
from wilful acts or from acts meant to injure them5 and this rule
applies to children as well as to adults.6 Some courts have held,
'Irvine v. Wood, 51 N. Y. 224 (1872); Congreve v. Smith, 18 N. Y.
79 (1858); Congreve v. Morgan, id. 84 (1858); Creed v. Hartman, 29
N. Y. 591 (1864).
' Cushing-Wetmore Co. v. Gray, 152 Cal. 118, 92 Pac. 70 (1907)
Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225 (1842); Oehler v. Levy, 234 IIl 595,
85 N. E. 271 (1908); Haynes v. Brewer, 194 Mass. 435, 80 N. E. 503
(1907); City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910);
Green v. Thresher, 235 Pa. St. 169, 83 Atl. 711 (1912) ; Liermann v.
Milwaukee, 132 Wis. 628, 113 N. W. 65 (1907); Lyons v. Gulliver, 1
Ch. 631 (England, 1914).
'Riedel v. West Jersey &c. R. Co., 177 Fed. 374 (1910) ; City of
Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. 484 (1895); O'Brien v. Union
Freight R. Co., 209 Mass. 449, 95 N. E. 861 (1911); Weitzmann v. A. L.
Barber Asphault Co., 190 N. Y. 452, 83 N. E. 477 (1908); Cauley v.
Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 95 Pa. St. 398 (1880).
"Pekin v. McMahon, supra, note 3; Driscoll v. Scanlon, 165 Mass.
348, 43 N. E. 100 (1896); Kinney v. Onsted, 113 Mich. 96, 71 N. W.
482 (1897); Daneck v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 59 N. J. L. 415, 37 Atl.
59 (1897); Steiger v. Van Sicklen, 132 N. Y. 499, 30 N. E. 987 (1892).
"Lake Shore &c. R. Co., v. Bodemer, 139 Ill. 596, 29 N. E. 692
(1892); O'Brien v. Union Freight R. Co., supra, note 3; Magar v.
Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387, 76 N. E. 474 (1906); Cleveland &c. R. Co. v.
Workman, 66 Ohio St. 509, 64 N. E. 582 (1902); Rodgers v. Lees, 140
Pa. St. 475, 21 Atl. 399 (1891).
'West v. Poor, 196 Mass. 183, 81 N. E. 960 (1907); McAlpin v.
Powell, 70 N. Y. 126 (1877); Rodgers v. Lees, supra, note 5; Walsh v.
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however, that where a nuisance exists the owner of property must
inform trespassers if he knows of their presence and of its existence.7
And it is established that one who merely suffers or acquiesces in
the use of his premises, or permits others to enter thereon for their
own purposes, 'does not owe to such persons the duty to those who
enter by invitation. 8 It appears, therefore, that the plaintiff had no
cause of action against the defendant unless it could be shown that
the latter acted wilfully and with intent to injure him.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE; MUNICIPAL COURT; JURISDICTION WHERE
AMOUNT EXCEEDS ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS.-Five parties, named
as plaintiffs in one summons, brought an action in the municipal
court of the city of New York demanding separate and distinctjudgments. The amount involved exceeded one thousand dollars
and defendant denied the jurisdiction of the court over the sub-ject matter of the action. Held, there was but one action
and but one summons, and the amount demanded in that summons
exceeded one thousand dollars. Hence the municipal court was with-
out jurisdiction to entertain the action. Dilworth v. Yellow Taxi
Corp., 220 App. Div. (N. Y.) 772 (2nd Dep't. 1927), reversing 127
Misc. 543.
The Civil Practice Act' provides than all persons may be joined
in one action as plaintiffs where the right to relief arises out of the
same transaction. A section of the Municipal Court Code incor-
porates this section into the code.2 However the jurisdiction of the
municipal court is limited to actions where the amount demanded
in the summons does not exceed one thousand dollars. 3 So that.
desirable as it may be that all actions arising out of one transaction
be set out in one summons and complaint by the various plaintiffs
this cannot be done in the municipal court where the amounts sued
for by the respective plaintiffs total in the aggregate more than one
thousand dollars. The Court of Appeals has stated that the purpose
of the Civil Practice Act provision 4 is "to lessen the delay and ex-
pense of litigation by permitting the claims of different plaintiffs to
be decided in one action instead of many when, although legally
separate and distinct, they nevertheless so involve common questions
and spring out of identical or related transactions that their common
Pittsburgh Rwys. Co., 221 Pa. St. 463, 70 Atl. 826 (1908). But see
Peuso v. McCormick, 125 Ind. 116, 25 N. E. 156 (1890).
'Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1897) ; Hobbs v.
George W. Blanchard &c. Co., 74 N. H. 116, 65 Atl. 382 (1906).
'Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Il. 182, 32 N. E. 182 (1892); Redigan z'.
Boston &c. R. Co., 155 Mass. 44, 28 N. E. 1133 (1891); Cusick v.
Adams, 115 N. Y. 55, 21 N. E. 673 (1889); Fox v. Warner-Quinlan
Asphault Co., 204 N. Y. 240, 97 N. E. 497 (1912); Weaver v. Carnegie
Steel Co., 223 Pa. St. 238, 72 Atl. 552 (1909).
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 209.
2N. Y. Mun. Ct. Code § 15.
'Ibid., § 6.
4 Supra, note 1.
